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vulnerability / NVI-00013110 / Revision 2

`@bsv/wallet-toolbox` / `-client` / `-mobile` don't verify storage-supplied recipient output scripts against caller-requested outputs in createAction

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @bsv/wallet-toolbox, @bsv/wallet-toolbox-client, @bsv/wallet-toolbox-mobile. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-36f9-7rg5-cpf8CVE-2026-56744

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

@bsv/wallet-toolbox

source listed
  • >= 1.1.47, < 2.4.0

Reported by @echennells (Eric Chennells). Migrated from public issue #191 to a private advisory. **Affected:** `@bsv/wallet-toolbox` / `-client` / `-mobile`. Verified in `2.1.21` and `2.1.21-parity-fix.2`; the relevant code is the same at current HEAD **Summary:** When `createAction` runs against a remote `StorageClient`, the storage server returns the outputs to build. `buildSignableTransaction` takes each non-change output's `lockingScript` from the storage response and signs it, without comparing it to the `lockingScript` the caller supplied in `args.outputs`. `WalletPermissionsManager.createAction` parses the built transaction and has `args.outputs` available, but uses the tx only for `inputs` and `getFee()`; it does not inspect `tx.outputs`. A storage provider that returns a different recipient script than requested will therefore have that script signed and broadcast, while the calling app and UI still show the originally requested recipient. **Relevant code:** - `signer/methods/buildSignableTransaction.js` — non-change output `lockingScript = asBsvSdkScript(out.lockingScript)`, sourced from the storage response; `args.outputs` is not consulted. - `WalletPermissionsManag

GitHub Advisory Database

@bsv/wallet-toolbox-client

source listed
  • >= 1.1.47, < 2.4.0

Reported by @echennells (Eric Chennells). Migrated from public issue #191 to a private advisory. **Affected:** `@bsv/wallet-toolbox` / `-client` / `-mobile`. Verified in `2.1.21` and `2.1.21-parity-fix.2`; the relevant code is the same at current HEAD **Summary:** When `createAction` runs against a remote `StorageClient`, the storage server returns the outputs to build. `buildSignableTransaction` takes each non-change output's `lockingScript` from the storage response and signs it, without comparing it to the `lockingScript` the caller supplied in `args.outputs`. `WalletPermissionsManager.createAction` parses the built transaction and has `args.outputs` available, but uses the tx only for `inputs` and `getFee()`; it does not inspect `tx.outputs`. A storage provider that returns a different recipient script than requested will therefore have that script signed and broadcast, while the calling app and UI still show the originally requested recipient. **Relevant code:** - `signer/methods/buildSignableTransaction.js` — non-change output `lockingScript = asBsvSdkScript(out.lockingScript)`, sourced from the storage response; `args.outputs` is not consulted. - `WalletPermissionsManag

GitHub Advisory Database

@bsv/wallet-toolbox-mobile

source listed
  • >= 1.3.21, < 2.4.0

Reported by @echennells (Eric Chennells). Migrated from public issue #191 to a private advisory. **Affected:** `@bsv/wallet-toolbox` / `-client` / `-mobile`. Verified in `2.1.21` and `2.1.21-parity-fix.2`; the relevant code is the same at current HEAD **Summary:** When `createAction` runs against a remote `StorageClient`, the storage server returns the outputs to build. `buildSignableTransaction` takes each non-change output's `lockingScript` from the storage response and signs it, without comparing it to the `lockingScript` the caller supplied in `args.outputs`. `WalletPermissionsManager.createAction` parses the built transaction and has `args.outputs` available, but uses the tx only for `inputs` and `getFee()`; it does not inspect `tx.outputs`. A storage provider that returns a different recipient script than requested will therefore have that script signed and broadcast, while the calling app and UI still show the originally requested recipient. **Relevant code:** - `signer/methods/buildSignableTransaction.js` — non-change output `lockingScript = asBsvSdkScript(out.lockingScript)`, sourced from the storage response; `args.outputs` is not consulted. - `WalletPermissionsManag

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-36f9-7rg5-cpf8 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2026-56744 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗