vulnerability / NVI-00013134 / Revision 1
OpenC3 COSMOS: Stored, cross-user XSS via Telemetry screen BUTTON widget
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @openc3/vue-common. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.6 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@openc3/vue-common
source listed>= 5.0.6, <= 7.2.1
## Summary A user who can save a telemetry **screen** (permission `system_set`) can embed JavaScript in a screen `BUTTON` widget. The `BUTTON` widget **`eval()`s the stored button text in the browser** when the button is activated, and screens are **shared content rendered to other users in the scope**. As a result, an attacker's stored JavaScript executes **in a different operator's authenticated session** — a **stored, cross-user XSS** (not self-XSS). The payload runs in the COSMOS origin and can read `localStorage.openc3Token` (the victim's session token), enabling **session/account takeover** and, via the victim's privileges, a path to server-side code execution through the Script Runner. The site's Content-Security-Policy permits `'unsafe-inline'`/`'unsafe-eval'` (see "Contributing factor"), so the injected script runs unimpeded. - **Product:** OpenC3 COSMOS (Core; likely Enterprise — see scoping note) - **Affected version:** confirmed **7.2.0** (latest, tested 2026-06-25); the code path is present on `main`. Lower bound for maintainer to confirm. - **Reporter:** _Arpit Kubadia_ ## Description & root cause 1. **Screen save (the store):** `POST /openc3-api/screen` → `Screen
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-gvf2-2rh5-mpgf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.