vulnerability / NVI-00013151 / Revision 1
mpp vulnerable to Gas Draining with no limit
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mpp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
mpp
source listed>= 0.2.0, < 0.6.0
### Details When the server acts as the fee_payer, the `mpp` Elixir 0.4.0 does not validate `gas_limit`, `max_fee_per_gas` and `max_priority_fee_per_gas` before cosigning the client's fee-payer transaction. A malicious client embeds arbitrarily large `max_fee_per_gas` and `max_priority_fee_per_gas` values in the signed envelope. The server cosigns and broadcasts — paying those inflated gas costs from its own wallet based on the `effective_gas_price` calculated from the high `max_fee_per_gas` and `max_priority_fee_per_gas` set by the client. **Vulnerable function:** `cosign_fee_payer/3` in `transaction.ex` around lines 229–262. ### PoC The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run: ```bash unzip mpp_elixir_PoC.zip cd mpp_elixir docker build -t mpp-elixir-gasdrain . docker run --rm mpp-elixir-gasdrain ``` There are more details in `mpp_elixir/README.md` ### Impact By draining the server's wallet, an attacker causes direct financial loss to the organization. Furthermore, if the server's funds are drained completely, legitimate clients will have
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-vv77-66rf-pm86 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.