vulnerability / NVI-00013168 / Revision 1
Trigger.dev: Run replay injects a task run into an attacker-chosen environment (cross-tenant write)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for trigger.dev. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
trigger.dev
source listed< 4.5.2
### Summary The dashboard replay action authorizes the source run (it must belong to the caller's org), but the target environment for the replayed run is taken verbatim from the request body and is never checked for org or project membership. The environment lookup used by the replay path filters by id only. As a result, an authenticated user can replay one of their own runs into another organization's or project's environment, creating a task run there that consumes the victim tenant's queue and compute and pollutes their run history. ### Details The replay action member-scopes the source run correctly (apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts, the findFirst on taskRun filtered by `project.organization.members.some.userId`), but passes the target environment straight from the submitted form, resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts:344-346: ```js const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService(); const newRun = await replayRunService.call(taskRun, { environmentId: submission.value.environment, // attacker-controlled, unvalidated payload: submission.value.payload, ... }); ``` `submission.value.environment` comes from ReplayRunData (apps/webapp/app/v3/
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-qxpp-qjg8-x4jv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.