vulnerability / NVI-00013205 / Revision 2
Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for trigger.dev. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
trigger.dev
source listed<= 4.5.1
### Summary The run replay `action` function at `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` has no authentication or authorization check. While the `loader` (GET) in the same file properly calls `requireUser(request)` and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the `action` (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's `friendlyId`. ### Details **Vulnerable file:** `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` **The `loader` (line 28-29) — properly authenticated:** ```typescript export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) { const user = await requireUser(request); // ✓ Auth check const userId = user.id; // ... queries scoped to user's orgs } ``` **The `action` (line 166-193) — NO authentication:** ```typescript export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => { const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params); // ✗ NO requireUser() call // ✗ NO requireUserId() call // ✗ NO org membership check const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId: runParam, // Queries
trigger.dev
source listedSEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.2
### Summary The run replay `action` function at `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` has no authentication or authorization check. While the `loader` (GET) in the same file properly calls `requireUser(request)` and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the `action` (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's `friendlyId`. ### Details **Vulnerable file:** `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` **The `loader` (line 28-29) — properly authenticated:** ```typescript export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) { const user = await requireUser(request); // ✓ Auth check const userId = user.id; // ... queries scoped to user's orgs } ``` **The `action` (line 166-193) — NO authentication:** ```typescript export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => { const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params); // ✗ NO requireUser() call // ✗ NO requireUserId() call // ✗ NO org membership check const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId: runParam, // Queries
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.2 for trigger.dev. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.