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vulnerability / NVI-00013221 / Revision 1

Nodemailer: Process-global DNS cache reuses TLS `servername` across transports, enabling cross-tenant SMTP credential disclosure

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nodemailer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-6vj9-mwq6-2f5v

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

5.9 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

nodemailer

source listed
  • >= 5.0.0, < 10.0.2

### Summary Nodemailer's process-global DNS cache is keyed only by `host`, but each cache entry also stores the caller-specific TLS `servername`. When two direct SMTPS transports use the same DNS host with different `tls.servername` values, the first transport's server name is returned to the second transport and overwrites its explicitly configured value. As a result, Nodemailer sends the wrong SNI value and verifies the peer certificate against the wrong identity. In a multi-tenant service or SNI-routed SMTP gateway, one tenant can prime the cache so that a victim transport connects to the attacker's TLS virtual host, accepts the attacker's certificate with `rejectUnauthorized: true`, and sends the victim's SMTP credentials to it. ## Affected component - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Package:** `nodemailer` - **Repository:** https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer - **Tested version:** `10.0.1` - **Tested commit:** `40d52215aac65b811d7e131bc916f68605efd9d2` - **Runtime-confirmed vulnerable versions:** `5.0.0` and `10.0.1` - **Affected versions:** `>= 5.0.0, <= 10.0.1` - **Patched versions:** None known at the time of this report - **Affected mode:** Direct TLS/SMTPS connections (`s

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-6vj9-mwq6-2f5v ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

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