vulnerability / NVI-00013243 / Revision 2
GitPython: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in Actor.name_email_regex — commit author/committer field parsing
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for GitPython. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.521%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.44248. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
GitPython
source listed<= 3.1.59
### Summary GitPython's `Actor.name_email_regex` regular expression (`git/util.py`, line 863) is vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS — Regular Expression Denial of Service). When GitPython parses the `author` or `committer` header of a git commit object that contains a long string with an unterminated ``), the Python regex engine enters quadratic backtracking, causing complete single-threaded CPU exhaustion proportional to the square of the input length. A single crafted commit object can block any GitPython API call that reads `.author` or `.committer` for **over two minutes per invocation**, enabling denial of service against CI runners, code-hosting backends, repository-scanning pipelines, or any service that processes commits from third-party or untrusted repositories. --- ### Details **Vulnerable file and line:** `git/util.py`, line 863: ```python name_email_regex = re.compile(r"(.*) ") ``` This regex is evaluated inside `Actor._from_string()` (line 909) every time GitPython resolves a commit's `.author` or `.committer` property. **Full call chain — from public API to vulnerable sink:** commit.author # any ordinary GitPython API
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-87819 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.