vulnerability / NVI-00013832 / Revision 1
MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary server-local file upload to Jira/Confluence attachments via unrestricted file_path parameters
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mcp-atlassian. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
mcp-atlassian
source listed< 0.22.0
## Summary The Jira and Confluence attachment upload tools accept caller-controlled file path parameters and read those paths from the MCP server's local filesystem before uploading the file as an Atlassian attachment. In local `stdio` deployments, this can expose files readable by the user's MCP process. In documented HTTP/SSE or `streamable-http` deployments, the impact is higher: any MCP client that is allowed to invoke write/upload tools can cause the server process to read a server-local file and upload it to Jira or Confluence. This is not dependent on an AI prompt injection or model behavior. It can be triggered deterministically with a normal MCP tool call. ## Details The vulnerable behavior exists because upload tool arguments are treated as server-local filesystem paths. Relevant implementation points: - `mcp_atlassian.confluence.attachments.AttachmentsMixin.upload_attachment` - Accepts `file_path`. - Converts the supplied value to an absolute path when needed. - Checks existence with `os.path.exists`. - Passes the path into the attachment upload flow. - `mcp_atlassian.confluence.attachments.AttachmentsMixin._upload_attachment_direct` - Opens the supplie
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.