vulnerability / NVI-00013845 / Revision 1
SurrealDB server-takeover via SurrealQL injection on backup import
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for surrealdb, surrealdb, surrealdb. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
surrealdb
source listed>= 2.2.0, < 2.2.2
The SurrealDB command-line tool allows exporting databases through the `export` command. It was discovered that table or field names are not properly sanitized in exports, leading to a SurrealQL injection when the backup is reimported. For the injection to occur, an authenticated System User with `OWNER` or `EDITOR` roles needs to create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL, subsequently exported using the `export` operation The attacker could achieve a privilege escalation and root level access to the SurrealDB instance if a higher privileged user subsequently performs the `import` operation. Furthermore, applications using SurrealDB that allow its users to define custom fields or tables are at risk of a universal second order SurrealQL injection, even if query parameters are properly sanitized. This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Critical, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment. ### Impact This attack can be used to perform privilege escalation and complete takeover (root access) of the SurrealDB instance, as well as being able to
surrealdb
source listed>= 2.1.0, < 2.1.5
The SurrealDB command-line tool allows exporting databases through the `export` command. It was discovered that table or field names are not properly sanitized in exports, leading to a SurrealQL injection when the backup is reimported. For the injection to occur, an authenticated System User with `OWNER` or `EDITOR` roles needs to create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL, subsequently exported using the `export` operation The attacker could achieve a privilege escalation and root level access to the SurrealDB instance if a higher privileged user subsequently performs the `import` operation. Furthermore, applications using SurrealDB that allow its users to define custom fields or tables are at risk of a universal second order SurrealQL injection, even if query parameters are properly sanitized. This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Critical, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment. ### Impact This attack can be used to perform privilege escalation and complete takeover (root access) of the SurrealDB instance, as well as being able to
surrealdb
source listed< 2.0.5
The SurrealDB command-line tool allows exporting databases through the `export` command. It was discovered that table or field names are not properly sanitized in exports, leading to a SurrealQL injection when the backup is reimported. For the injection to occur, an authenticated System User with `OWNER` or `EDITOR` roles needs to create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL, subsequently exported using the `export` operation The attacker could achieve a privilege escalation and root level access to the SurrealDB instance if a higher privileged user subsequently performs the `import` operation. Furthermore, applications using SurrealDB that allow its users to define custom fields or tables are at risk of a universal second order SurrealQL injection, even if query parameters are properly sanitized. This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Critical, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment. ### Impact This attack can be used to perform privilege escalation and complete takeover (root access) of the SurrealDB instance, as well as being able to
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-ccj3-5p93-8p42 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.