vulnerability / NVI-00013869 / Revision 1
RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via Malicious Field Length in AMQP Client
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go
source listed< 1.13.0
**Summary** A vulnerability in the readField function allows a malicious or compromised AMQP server to trigger an unhandled runtime panic in the client application, leading to an immediate crash of the entire process. **Details** When parsing incoming AMQP frames, the `readField` function processes byte-array fields (type tag `'x'`) by reading a 32-bit big-endian integer to determine the length of the data payload. ```go // read.go:253-263 case 'x': var len int32 if err = binary.Read(r, binary.BigEndian, &len); err != nil { return nil, err } value := make([]byte, len) // PANICS if len < 0 ``` If a server transmits a length value of `0xFFFFFFFF`, it is interpreted by the client as a signed 32-bit integer with a value of `-1`. Passing a negative integer to Go's built-in make() function for slice allocation triggers an unrecoverable runtime panic (panic: len out of range). Because the reader goroutine handles network I/O without an explicit recover() wrapper, this panic propagates up to the runtime root, abruptly terminating the host application. **Attack Vector / Exploitation Scenario** An attacker capable of spoofing, compromising, or controlling an AMQ
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-4v58-74mf-rjx3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.