vulnerability / NVI-00013871 / Revision 1
OpenClaw's POSIX node system.run safe-bin allowlist could be widened by shell expansion
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for openclaw. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
openclaw
source listed< 2026.5.18
### Summary On POSIX nodes, OpenClaw's `system.run` safe-bin checks could approve a command before shell expansion changed how the command was interpreted. A value that appeared to be a safe-bin argument could expand into additional shell words and become a file operand. This issue is limited to paired POSIX node execution through `system.run` with safe-bin or allowlist-style auto-approval. It is not an unauthenticated node takeover. ### Affected configurations This affects deployments where: - a POSIX node is paired to the gateway - `system.run` is reachable by an authenticated operator or agent flow - exec policy uses safe-bin or allowlist-based auto-approval - the approved command contains shell-expanded values that can change argv shape ### Impact A lower-privilege operator flow could cause an approved safe-bin command to read a node-local file that was not intended by the policy. Depending on the local files available to the node process, this could expose OpenClaw configuration data or other node-local information. The issue is a policy-enforcement gap in argv validation, not a general statement that every safe-bin command is unsafe. ### Patched Versions The first s
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-mhq8-78pj-5j79 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.