vulnerability / NVI-00013908 / Revision 2
ApostropheCMS: Arbitrary file read via import-export attachment-name path traversal
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @apostrophecms/import-export. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.5 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.465%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.40384. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@apostrophecms/import-export
source listed<= 3.6.1
## Summary The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module reconstructs the on-disk source path of every imported attachment from JSON metadata contained in the uploaded archive. The archive carries an `aposAttachments.json` file whose `name` and `extension` fields are concatenated into a filesystem path with no traversal check. The zip-slip guard that the module applies during tar extraction validates tar entry names only and does not cover this second path, which is built after extraction. The file at the resulting path is read and copied into the public uploads directory, then served over HTTP without authentication. A `../` sequence in `name` makes the module read a file outside the extraction directory and publish it at an anonymous URL. Result: an authenticated contributor reads any file on the host whose name ends in an allowlisted extension (other users' uploaded documents, text or CSV dumps, PDFs) by importing a crafted archive and fetching the planted attachment anonymously. ## Affected apostrophecms/apostrophe with the `@apostrophecms/import-export` module installed and registered. Module version 3.6.1 (current latest), tested against Apostrophe 4.31.0 (monorepo HEAD 4d4
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-63667 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.