vulnerability / NVI-00013918 / Revision 1
fast-uri vulnerable to server-side request forgery via repeated hostname percent-decoding
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fast-uri, fast-uri, fast-uri. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
fast-uri
source listed>= 2.4.1, < 2.4.5
### Impact `fast-uri` decodes a hostname's percent escapes twice in a single `normalize()` or `resolve()` call: once during parsing and again during authority recomposition. A nested percent-encoded host therefore survives the first decode and is turned into a live destination by the second, so `normalize('http://%256c%256f%2563%2561%256c%2568%256f%2573%2574/')` returns `http://localhost/`. Applications that normalize or resolve an untrusted URI before an SSRF check, redirect validation, or host allowlist can be steered to a different destination, including internal addresses such as loopback or a cloud metadata endpoint, than the encoded input appeared to contain. This is an incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2026-6322, whose encoded-authority-delimiter fix introduced the second decode. ### Patches Fixed in `fast-uri` 2.4.5, 3.1.6, and 4.1.3. ### Workarounds Reject untrusted URIs whose host component contains an encoded percent sign (`%25`) before passing them to `normalize()` or `resolve()`.
fast-uri
source listed>= 3.1.2, < 3.1.6
### Impact `fast-uri` decodes a hostname's percent escapes twice in a single `normalize()` or `resolve()` call: once during parsing and again during authority recomposition. A nested percent-encoded host therefore survives the first decode and is turned into a live destination by the second, so `normalize('http://%256c%256f%2563%2561%256c%2568%256f%2573%2574/')` returns `http://localhost/`. Applications that normalize or resolve an untrusted URI before an SSRF check, redirect validation, or host allowlist can be steered to a different destination, including internal addresses such as loopback or a cloud metadata endpoint, than the encoded input appeared to contain. This is an incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2026-6322, whose encoded-authority-delimiter fix introduced the second decode. ### Patches Fixed in `fast-uri` 2.4.5, 3.1.6, and 4.1.3. ### Workarounds Reject untrusted URIs whose host component contains an encoded percent sign (`%25`) before passing them to `normalize()` or `resolve()`.
fast-uri
source listed>= 4.0.0, < 4.1.3
### Impact `fast-uri` decodes a hostname's percent escapes twice in a single `normalize()` or `resolve()` call: once during parsing and again during authority recomposition. A nested percent-encoded host therefore survives the first decode and is turned into a live destination by the second, so `normalize('http://%256c%256f%2563%2561%256c%2568%256f%2573%2574/')` returns `http://localhost/`. Applications that normalize or resolve an untrusted URI before an SSRF check, redirect validation, or host allowlist can be steered to a different destination, including internal addresses such as loopback or a cloud metadata endpoint, than the encoded input appeared to contain. This is an incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2026-6322, whose encoded-authority-delimiter fix introduced the second decode. ### Patches Fixed in `fast-uri` 2.4.5, 3.1.6, and 4.1.3. ### Workarounds Reject untrusted URIs whose host component contains an encoded percent sign (`%25`) before passing them to `normalize()` or `resolve()`.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fph4-wmhf-6fwf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.