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vulnerability / NVI-00013926 / Revision 1

KubeEdge: Unbounded allocation in viaduct packer enables authenticated remote DoS against CloudHub

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge, github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge, github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-gfw4-49f9-cp25CVE-2026-62370

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

6.5 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge

source listed
  • >= 1.0.0, < 1.21.2

## Summary KubeEdge CloudHub uses the viaduct packer to decode messages received from connected peers. The packer reads a 32-bit payload length from the message header and previously allocated a buffer of that size without enforcing an upper bound. An authenticated peer that can establish a viaduct connection to CloudHub can send a crafted message header containing an excessively large payload length. This may cause CloudHub to allocate a large amount of memory and can result in memory exhaustion, process termination, or denial of service. ## Impact A successfully authenticated malicious or compromised edge node may repeatedly send crafted viaduct message headers to increase CloudHub memory consumption. Depending on available memory and deployment limits, exploitation may cause: * Increased CloudHub memory usage * Out-of-memory termination * CloudHub restart loops * Temporary disruption of cloud-edge communication Authentication to the viaduct endpoint is required. This issue does not provide unauthenticated access or direct code execution. ## Root cause The viaduct packer trusted the payload length encoded in the message header and allocated the payload buffer before vali

GitHub Advisory Database

github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge

source listed
  • >= 1.22.0, < 1.22.2

## Summary KubeEdge CloudHub uses the viaduct packer to decode messages received from connected peers. The packer reads a 32-bit payload length from the message header and previously allocated a buffer of that size without enforcing an upper bound. An authenticated peer that can establish a viaduct connection to CloudHub can send a crafted message header containing an excessively large payload length. This may cause CloudHub to allocate a large amount of memory and can result in memory exhaustion, process termination, or denial of service. ## Impact A successfully authenticated malicious or compromised edge node may repeatedly send crafted viaduct message headers to increase CloudHub memory consumption. Depending on available memory and deployment limits, exploitation may cause: * Increased CloudHub memory usage * Out-of-memory termination * CloudHub restart loops * Temporary disruption of cloud-edge communication Authentication to the viaduct endpoint is required. This issue does not provide unauthenticated access or direct code execution. ## Root cause The viaduct packer trusted the payload length encoded in the message header and allocated the payload buffer before vali

GitHub Advisory Database

github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge

source listed
  • >= 1.23.0, < 1.23.1

## Summary KubeEdge CloudHub uses the viaduct packer to decode messages received from connected peers. The packer reads a 32-bit payload length from the message header and previously allocated a buffer of that size without enforcing an upper bound. An authenticated peer that can establish a viaduct connection to CloudHub can send a crafted message header containing an excessively large payload length. This may cause CloudHub to allocate a large amount of memory and can result in memory exhaustion, process termination, or denial of service. ## Impact A successfully authenticated malicious or compromised edge node may repeatedly send crafted viaduct message headers to increase CloudHub memory consumption. Depending on available memory and deployment limits, exploitation may cause: * Increased CloudHub memory usage * Out-of-memory termination * CloudHub restart loops * Temporary disruption of cloud-edge communication Authentication to the viaduct endpoint is required. This issue does not provide unauthenticated access or direct code execution. ## Root cause The viaduct packer trusted the payload length encoded in the message header and allocated the payload buffer before vali

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-gfw4-49f9-cp25 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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