vulnerability / NVI-00013941 / Revision 2
Graylog token revocation endpoint allows authenticated users to delete other users’ access tokens
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.graylog2:graylog2-server, org.graylog2:graylog2-server, org.graylog2:graylog2-server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.565%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.47039. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
org.graylog2:graylog2-server
source listed>= 6.2.0, < 6.3.12
### Impact Graylog contains an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the token revocation endpoint. An authenticated user can delete access tokens belonging to other users, including service account tokens and administrator tokens, if they know or can guess a valid token identifier. The issue does not expose token contents, but it allows unauthorized token deletion, leading to integrity impact and potential availability impact for access token based integrations. ### Patches The issue has been fixed in the following Graylog versions: `6.3.12`, `7.0.7`, `7.1.2`. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or above to remediate the vulnerability. Graylog Cloud has already been patched. ### Workarounds There are no feasible workarounds for this issue. Upgrading to a patched version is recommended. Customers using Graylog Enterprise or Security can review the audit log[^1] for suspicious activity. Audit log lines for successful token deletions begin with `access token deleted from user`. ### Credits Thanks to michaelddickenson and sreelim for reporting. [^1]: https://go2docs.graylog.
org.graylog2:graylog2-server
source listed>= 7.0.0, < 7.0.7
### Impact Graylog contains an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the token revocation endpoint. An authenticated user can delete access tokens belonging to other users, including service account tokens and administrator tokens, if they know or can guess a valid token identifier. The issue does not expose token contents, but it allows unauthorized token deletion, leading to integrity impact and potential availability impact for access token based integrations. ### Patches The issue has been fixed in the following Graylog versions: `6.3.12`, `7.0.7`, `7.1.2`. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or above to remediate the vulnerability. Graylog Cloud has already been patched. ### Workarounds There are no feasible workarounds for this issue. Upgrading to a patched version is recommended. Customers using Graylog Enterprise or Security can review the audit log[^1] for suspicious activity. Audit log lines for successful token deletions begin with `access token deleted from user`. ### Credits Thanks to michaelddickenson and sreelim for reporting. [^1]: https://go2docs.graylog.
org.graylog2:graylog2-server
source listed>= 7.1.0, < 7.1.2
### Impact Graylog contains an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the token revocation endpoint. An authenticated user can delete access tokens belonging to other users, including service account tokens and administrator tokens, if they know or can guess a valid token identifier. The issue does not expose token contents, but it allows unauthorized token deletion, leading to integrity impact and potential availability impact for access token based integrations. ### Patches The issue has been fixed in the following Graylog versions: `6.3.12`, `7.0.7`, `7.1.2`. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or above to remediate the vulnerability. Graylog Cloud has already been patched. ### Workarounds There are no feasible workarounds for this issue. Upgrading to a patched version is recommended. Customers using Graylog Enterprise or Security can review the audit log[^1] for suspicious activity. Audit log lines for successful token deletions begin with `access token deleted from user`. ### Credits Thanks to michaelddickenson and sreelim for reporting. [^1]: https://go2docs.graylog.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-j769-9gv9-65gr ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-55867 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.