vulnerability / NVI-00013950 / Revision 2
xmldom: Parser silently accepts a not-well-formed end tag whose name is followed by a line break and trailing content
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @xmldom/xmldom, @xmldom/xmldom, xmldom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.619%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.49797. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@xmldom/xmldom
source listed>= 0.7.0, <= 0.8.14
## Summary xmldom's parser silently accepts a **not-well-formed end tag** whose valid name is followed by trailing content — e.g. ``. The element is closed, the trailing content is discarded, and no error is reported, even though the XML end-tag production allows only optional whitespace after the name and both Chromium and Firefox reject such input as `application/xml`. An application that relies on xmldom to reject not-well-formed input therefore receives a false "valid" result for a document the specification and browsers consider malformed. ## Details Across every affected version, an end tag whose valid `Name` is followed by trailing content before `>` is silently accepted: the element is closed, the residue is dropped, and no error is reported. How much leaks differs by line (see Affected Versions), but the observable weakness is the same. On the current (`0.9.x`) line, the parser validates the end-tag name against the XML `ETag` production with an anchored regular expression (`^ QName S? $`). That expression is compiled with the `m` (multiline) flag by a shared builder, so `$` matches at an interior line terminator: a valid name on the first line satisfies the a
@xmldom/xmldom
source listed>= 0.9.0, <= 0.9.11
## Summary xmldom's parser silently accepts a **not-well-formed end tag** whose valid name is followed by trailing content — e.g. ``. The element is closed, the trailing content is discarded, and no error is reported, even though the XML end-tag production allows only optional whitespace after the name and both Chromium and Firefox reject such input as `application/xml`. An application that relies on xmldom to reject not-well-formed input therefore receives a false "valid" result for a document the specification and browsers consider malformed. ## Details Across every affected version, an end tag whose valid `Name` is followed by trailing content before `>` is silently accepted: the element is closed, the residue is dropped, and no error is reported. How much leaks differs by line (see Affected Versions), but the observable weakness is the same. On the current (`0.9.x`) line, the parser validates the end-tag name against the XML `ETag` production with an anchored regular expression (`^ QName S? $`). That expression is compiled with the `m` (multiline) flag by a shared builder, so `$` matches at an interior line terminator: a valid name on the first line satisfies the a
xmldom
source listed<= 0.6.0
## Summary xmldom's parser silently accepts a **not-well-formed end tag** whose valid name is followed by trailing content — e.g. ``. The element is closed, the trailing content is discarded, and no error is reported, even though the XML end-tag production allows only optional whitespace after the name and both Chromium and Firefox reject such input as `application/xml`. An application that relies on xmldom to reject not-well-formed input therefore receives a false "valid" result for a document the specification and browsers consider malformed. ## Details Across every affected version, an end tag whose valid `Name` is followed by trailing content before `>` is silently accepted: the element is closed, the residue is dropped, and no error is reported. How much leaks differs by line (see Affected Versions), but the observable weakness is the same. On the current (`0.9.x`) line, the parser validates the end-tag name against the XML `ETag` production with an anchored regular expression (`^ QName S? $`). That expression is compiled with the `m` (multiline) flag by a shared builder, so `$` matches at an interior line terminator: a valid name on the first line satisfies the a
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-6h8r-xr42-gp59 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-83611 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.