vulnerability / NVI-00013952 / Revision 1
OpenChoreo: Unauthenticated access to data-plane operations via OpenChoreo cluster-gateway management APIs
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.6 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo
source listed< 1.0.2
### Summary The OpenChoreo control-plane **cluster-gateway** served its caller-facing management APIs on the same network listener that accepts data-plane agent connections. In the multi-cluster topology that listener is published outside the cluster, and the management APIs did not authenticate the calling client. A party able to reach the listener could therefore invoke privileged data-plane operations without authenticating and without passing through the OpenChoreo API server's authorization. ### Impact An attacker who can reach the externally published cluster-gateway endpoint can perform data-plane operations normally restricted to the OpenChoreo API server and gated by its authorization — including proxying the data plane's Kubernetes API and executing commands inside workload pods. This can result in full compromise of workloads on the affected data plane (disclosure, tampering, and denial of service). The exposure applies to the multi-cluster / remote data-plane topology, where the cluster-gateway is published outside the cluster so remote data-plane agents can connect. That same externally reachable listener also served the caller-facing management APIs, which did not a
github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo
source listed>= 1.1.0, < 1.1.2
### Summary The OpenChoreo control-plane **cluster-gateway** served its caller-facing management APIs on the same network listener that accepts data-plane agent connections. In the multi-cluster topology that listener is published outside the cluster, and the management APIs did not authenticate the calling client. A party able to reach the listener could therefore invoke privileged data-plane operations without authenticating and without passing through the OpenChoreo API server's authorization. ### Impact An attacker who can reach the externally published cluster-gateway endpoint can perform data-plane operations normally restricted to the OpenChoreo API server and gated by its authorization — including proxying the data plane's Kubernetes API and executing commands inside workload pods. This can result in full compromise of workloads on the affected data plane (disclosure, tampering, and denial of service). The exposure applies to the multi-cluster / remote data-plane topology, where the cluster-gateway is published outside the cluster so remote data-plane agents can connect. That same externally reachable listener also served the caller-facing management APIs, which did not a
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-qh9r-j7rp-4x2m ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.