vulnerability / NVI-00013960 / Revision 2
Infracost: Terraform Cloud and registry token disclosure via unvalidated hostname
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/infracost/infracost. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.500%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.42861. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/infracost/infracost
source listed< 0.10.45
### Impact Sensitive information exposure in the Infracost Terraform Cloud/Enterprise integration. Several code paths attached a configured secret token to a request whose host was taken straight from the scanned Terraform, with no check that the host was the trusted endpoint. The condition that matters is whether a Terraform Cloud/Enterprise (or registry) token is present in the run: if one is, the injected hostname can disclose it. Impact therefore depends on the trigger. Under `on: pull_request` (the only configuration in Infracost's documentation) fork pull requests run without secrets, so no token is present. It only reaches token disclosure under `pull_request_target`, a same-repository pull request, or another CI setup that provides the token alongside untrusted Terraform, and exploiting an untrusted fork pull request also typically needs a maintainer to approve the workflow run. The patch scopes the token to the trusted host regardless of trigger. ### Patches Fixed in `v0.10.45` (#3590) by attaching a token only when the destination host matches the configured trusted host; otherwise Infracost refuses to send it and s
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-6x6c-w9w9-hv4h ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-71494 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.