vulnerability / NVI-00013965 / Revision 1
Hatchet allows cross-tenant write/DoS to other tenants' workers via Dispatcher gRPC UpsertWorkerLabels and Unsubscribe
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.4 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet
source listed>= 0.40.0, < 0.91.2
### Summary A **cross-tenant write / DoS** vulnerability in the Hatchet `Dispatcher` gRPC service allows any holder of a normal tenant-scoped API token (the lowest credential Hatchet issues — an `OWNER` of a brand-new tenant) to overwrite the affinity labels of, or disconnect from the dispatcher, any worker UUID belonging to any other tenant on the same Hatchet instance. The two affected RPCs — `Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels` and `Dispatcher/Unsubscribe` — read the caller's tenant from the bearer-token context only for analytics and response shaping, and never use it to authorise the `worker_id` from the request body. ### Impact This CVE requires the attacker to successfully guess the target UUID. **Who is impacted.** Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance: - **Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)** — every tenant is exposed to every other tenant. - **Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance** — each team is exposed to every other team on the box. - **Any deployment where a single tenant's API token can be obtained by an attacker** (e.g. a leaked low-privilege CI token from a single tenant). One tok
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.