vulnerability / NVI-00013973 / Revision 1
PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for PraisonAI. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
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01 / Meaning
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7.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
PraisonAI
source listed< 4.6.58
### Summary `praisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` validates webhook URLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNS resolution fails (`socket.gaierror`), the validator **silently passes** the URL via `except socket.gaierror: pass`. Additionally, even when DNS succeeds at validation time, the webhook is fired much later by `JobExecutor._send_webhook()`, which calls `httpx.AsyncClient().post(job.webhook_url)` — performing a **fresh, independent DNS lookup** at execution time. Together, these flaws create a TOCTOU SSRF window. An attacker can: 1. Submit a job with `webhook_url` pointing to a hostname that currently does not resolve (NXDOMAIN) → validation passes (`gaierror` → `pass`) 2. Update DNS to point that hostname to `127.0.0.1` or another private IP 3. When the job completes, `_send_webhook()` resolves the hostname fresh → POST sent to the internal IP ### Details **Flaw 1 — Fail-open on DNS error (`jobs/models.py` lines 58-66):** ```python @field_validator("webhook_url") @classmethod def validate_webhook_url(cls, v): ... try: ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) ip_obj = ipaddress.ip
03 / Response
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04 / Limits
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05 / Provenance
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- GHSA-rg5q-pp8p-f7jm ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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