By Null Ventures MCP platform
Menu

vulnerability / NVI-00013981 / Revision 1

Jupyter Server: Stored XSS in `NbconvertFileHandler` / `NbconvertPostHandler` via missing `sandbox` CSP

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for jupyter-server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-fcw5-x6j4-ccmpCVE-2026-44727

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

5.4 critical

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

jupyter-server

source listed
  • <= 2.19.0

The nbconvert HTTP handlers in jupyter_server render user-authored notebook HTML under the Jupyter origin without a sandbox directive in their `Content-Security-Policy`. Combined with `nbconvert.HTMLExporter`'s default non-sanitizing behavior, a notebook carrying an HTML payload in a display_data output triggers stored XSS with cookie access, full /api/* authority, and kernel RCE. ### Impact An authenticated victim who navigates to `/nbconvert/html/` containing attacker-authored output can have their token exfiltrated to another domain because it is executed in the Jupyter origin. ### Patches Fixed in v2.20.0, commit 6cbee8d ### Workarounds For deployments where editing the installed jupyter_server is impractical (containerized builds, read-only images), adding this to jupyter_server_config.py has the same effect as the patch above without touching source files: ``` import jupyter_server.nbconvert.handlers as _nb def _csp(self): return super(type(self), self).content_security_policy + "; sandbox allow-scripts" _nb.NbconvertFileHandler.content_security_policy = p

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-fcw5-x6j4-ccmp ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗