vulnerability / NVI-00013999 / Revision 2
AsyncHttpClient doesn't verify SCRAM and Digest mutual-authentication responses
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
3.7 low
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.409%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.35315. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 3.0.8, <= 3.0.11
### Impact For SCRAM, and for Digest with mutual authentication, the client computes the server's verification value (the SCRAM ServerSignature, or the Digest rspauth) but does not act on the result. If the value is present and does not verify, the client only logs it and still delivers the response to the application as a successful, authenticated result. A server that never proved knowledge of the shared secret is accepted, so the client loses its ability to detect an impostor. Over TLS the real server always returns a valid value and the issue is inert; it matters over a non TLS transport, or when the transport is already compromised, where it removes the client's only signal that the peer does not know the secret. ### Affected versions * 3.x: 3.0.8 through 3.0.11 Earlier 3.0.x releases are not affected: neither SCRAM nor the Digest Authentication-Info handling existed before 3.0.8. The 2.x line is not affected either: it has no SCRAM support, and its interceptor chain does not implement Digest mutual authentication, so there is no verification result to act on. ### Patches Fixed in 3.0.12. A present ServerSignature (SCRAM) or rspauth (Digest) that does not verify now fails t
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fj9w-c36g-h5x8 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-85716 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.