vulnerability / NVI-00014020 / Revision 1
Open WebUI: Sign-in as another user via wildcard characters in the OAuth subject claim on SQLite
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for open-webui. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
open-webui
source listed>= 0.6.41, < 0.11.1
## Summary On SQLite deployments, the lookup that maps an external identity to a local account does a substring match instead of an exact match. A subject value containing SQL wildcard characters therefore matches accounts the value was never issued for, and the sign-in binds to whichever account the database returns first, which can be an administrator. The same defect affects SCIM external-ID resolution. PostgreSQL deployments are not affected, because they take a separate and correct code path. ## Preconditions * The database is SQLite. This is the default backend. PostgreSQL deployments are not affected at all. * OAuth or OIDC sign-in is configured, or SCIM provisioning is enabled. Both are off by default. * For an attacker to steer the match deliberately, they must control the value of the claim Open WebUI uses as the subject. That value is normally assigned by the identity provider and is not attacker-controlled: the shipped GitHub and Feishu configurations use provider-assigned numeric identifiers, and a standard OIDC `sub` is provider-assigned. The deliberate case therefore requires an operator to have pointed `OAUTH_SUB_CLAIM` at a claim the end user can set at the iden
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-wpmr-8h3q-fwj7 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.