vulnerability / NVI-00014025 / Revision 2
Nuxt: URL-handling weaknesses in `navigateTo` and `reloadNuxtApp`: SSR open redirect, client-side script execution via the `open` option, and protocol-relative bypass in `reloadNuxtApp`
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nuxt, nuxt. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.1 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.362%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.30133. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
nuxt
source listed>= 4.0.0, < 4.4.7
### Summary Three weaknesses in Nuxt's client-navigation URL handling, all reachable from documented public APIs (`navigateTo` and `reloadNuxtApp`): 1. **(CVE-2026-56326) SSR open redirect in `navigateTo` via path-normalisation bypass.** `navigateTo` decided whether a target was external by inspecting the raw input with `hasProtocol(..., { acceptRelative: true })`. Inputs such as `/..//evil.com`, `/.//evil.com`, `/%2e%2e//evil.com`, or `/app/..//evil.com` slipped past that check because they start with `/`, but WHATWG URL parsing then normalised them to the protocol-relative pathname `//evil.com`. The normalised value was written to the `Location` response header and into the `` body of the SSR redirect page, so a victim's browser would resolve the redirect cross-origin to the attacker's host. 2. **(CVE-2026-56698) Client-side script execution via `navigateTo({ open: ... })`.** The client-side early-open handler called `window.open(toPath, ...)` without applying the `isScriptProtocol` check that gates the normal `navigateTo` path. A target of `javascript:...` (or another script-capable scheme) passed to `navig
nuxt
source listed>= 3.5.0, < 3.21.7
### Summary Three weaknesses in Nuxt's client-navigation URL handling, all reachable from documented public APIs (`navigateTo` and `reloadNuxtApp`): 1. **(CVE-2026-56326) SSR open redirect in `navigateTo` via path-normalisation bypass.** `navigateTo` decided whether a target was external by inspecting the raw input with `hasProtocol(..., { acceptRelative: true })`. Inputs such as `/..//evil.com`, `/.//evil.com`, `/%2e%2e//evil.com`, or `/app/..//evil.com` slipped past that check because they start with `/`, but WHATWG URL parsing then normalised them to the protocol-relative pathname `//evil.com`. The normalised value was written to the `Location` response header and into the `` body of the SSR redirect page, so a victim's browser would resolve the redirect cross-origin to the attacker's host. 2. **(CVE-2026-56698) Client-side script execution via `navigateTo({ open: ... })`.** The client-side early-open handler called `window.open(toPath, ...)` without applying the `isScriptProtocol` check that gates the normal `navigateTo` path. A target of `javascript:...` (or another script-capable scheme) passed to `navig
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-c9cv-mq2m-ppp3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-56326 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.