vulnerability / NVI-00014047 / Revision 1
Umbraco: Delivery API leaks protected (Public Access) content through Content Picker / Multi-Node Tree Picker expansion
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for Umbraco.Cms, Umbraco.Cms, Umbraco.Cms. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
Umbraco.Cms
source listed>= 12.0.0, < 13.15.1
The Content Delivery API enforces member / Public Access protection only at the controller layer, against the node that is directly requested. When a public (unprotected) node references a protected node through a Content Picker or Multi-Node Tree Picker (including those nested inside Block List, Block Grid, or Rich Text Editor blocks), the Delivery API expands and serializes the protected node with no access check applied. Similarly, configuration based restrictions based on aliases of allowed or disallowed content types are by-passed for referenced content items that are retrieved via property expansion. As a result, an anonymous / unauthorized caller can retrieve a protected node's: - Name, route, and id — always, even without expansion, and - Full property values — when the request uses ?expand on the picker property. A direct request for the same protected node correctly returns 401 Unauthorized, which makes the leak easy to miss: the protection appears to work, but is bypassed via reference expansion. ### Impact Confidential, member-gated content (e.g. pricing, internal documents, gated articles) referenced by any publicly readable node is disclosed to unauthenticated clie
Umbraco.Cms
source listed>= 14.0.0-rc1, < 17.5.3
The Content Delivery API enforces member / Public Access protection only at the controller layer, against the node that is directly requested. When a public (unprotected) node references a protected node through a Content Picker or Multi-Node Tree Picker (including those nested inside Block List, Block Grid, or Rich Text Editor blocks), the Delivery API expands and serializes the protected node with no access check applied. Similarly, configuration based restrictions based on aliases of allowed or disallowed content types are by-passed for referenced content items that are retrieved via property expansion. As a result, an anonymous / unauthorized caller can retrieve a protected node's: - Name, route, and id — always, even without expansion, and - Full property values — when the request uses ?expand on the picker property. A direct request for the same protected node correctly returns 401 Unauthorized, which makes the leak easy to miss: the protection appears to work, but is bypassed via reference expansion. ### Impact Confidential, member-gated content (e.g. pricing, internal documents, gated articles) referenced by any publicly readable node is disclosed to unauthenticated clie
Umbraco.Cms
source listed>= 18.0.0, < 18.0.2
The Content Delivery API enforces member / Public Access protection only at the controller layer, against the node that is directly requested. When a public (unprotected) node references a protected node through a Content Picker or Multi-Node Tree Picker (including those nested inside Block List, Block Grid, or Rich Text Editor blocks), the Delivery API expands and serializes the protected node with no access check applied. Similarly, configuration based restrictions based on aliases of allowed or disallowed content types are by-passed for referenced content items that are retrieved via property expansion. As a result, an anonymous / unauthorized caller can retrieve a protected node's: - Name, route, and id — always, even without expansion, and - Full property values — when the request uses ?expand on the picker property. A direct request for the same protected node correctly returns 401 Unauthorized, which makes the leak easy to miss: the protection appears to work, but is bypassed via reference expansion. ### Impact Confidential, member-gated content (e.g. pricing, internal documents, gated articles) referenced by any publicly readable node is disclosed to unauthenticated clie
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-wr57-hqmp-fgvh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.