vulnerability / NVI-00014056 / Revision 1
RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Plaintext Credential Exposure via Exported PLAIN Authentication Struct Fields
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go
source listed< 1.13.0
## Summary An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the AMQP client implementation's authentication handling configuration. Following a successful connection handshake, the `Connection.Config.SASL` field stores the `Authentication` implementation state used to establish the session. For standard `PLAIN` authentication, this state utilizes the `PlainAuth` struct, which defines both `Username` and `Password` as publicly exported, plaintext string fields. Because this sensitive data is retained permanently in-memory within an exported field structure, any peripheral code, internal package, reflective logger, dependency, or automated debugging utility with access to the core `*Connection` object can read and expose the raw credentials. --- ## Vulnerability Details ### Mechanism The vulnerability stems from the structural design of the configuration storage used during and after the AMQP handshake: ```go // auth.go:21-23 type PlainAuth struct { Username string Password string // exported plaintext } ``` When an application initializes a connection, the `PlainAuth` object is deeply nested inside the configuration structure (`Connection.Config`). Even after the ha
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-27gv-rfvv-22mv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.