vulnerability / NVI-00014077 / Revision 1
CodeWhale: SSRF bypass - TOCTOU on DNS failure for DNS pinning
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for deepseek-tui, deepseek-tui, codewhale-tui, codewhale. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.6 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
deepseek-tui
source listed>= 0.8.5, <= 0.8.41
### Maintainer resolution The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below. ### Summary DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic. ### Details Simplified attack scenario: 1. Attacker asks agent to visit the `mydomain.com`. 2. CodeWhale tries to resolve the IP of `mydomain.com`, however, the custom DNS server that's controlled by the attacker marks the request DNS query as failed (Time of Check). 3. CodeWhale allows the code to continue as it expects it request to fail again. 4. On the secondary (Time of Use), the DNS server resolves mydomain.com to a local IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1) 5. The request is executed and the content from port 80 is returned to the attacker, allowing full bypass of SSRF mitigations. In the [DNS-pinning](https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/blob/8dff2f7525ead210a01347b48f53ae3f20
deepseek-tui
source listed>= 0.8.5, < 0.8.41
### Maintainer resolution The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below. ### Summary DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic. ### Details Simplified attack scenario: 1. Attacker asks agent to visit the `mydomain.com`. 2. CodeWhale tries to resolve the IP of `mydomain.com`, however, the custom DNS server that's controlled by the attacker marks the request DNS query as failed (Time of Check). 3. CodeWhale allows the code to continue as it expects it request to fail again. 4. On the secondary (Time of Use), the DNS server resolves mydomain.com to a local IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1) 5. The request is executed and the content from port 80 is returned to the attacker, allowing full bypass of SSRF mitigations. In the [DNS-pinning](https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/blob/8dff2f7525ead210a01347b48f53ae3f20
codewhale-tui
source listed>= 0.8.41, < 0.8.64
### Maintainer resolution The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below. ### Summary DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic. ### Details Simplified attack scenario: 1. Attacker asks agent to visit the `mydomain.com`. 2. CodeWhale tries to resolve the IP of `mydomain.com`, however, the custom DNS server that's controlled by the attacker marks the request DNS query as failed (Time of Check). 3. CodeWhale allows the code to continue as it expects it request to fail again. 4. On the secondary (Time of Use), the DNS server resolves mydomain.com to a local IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1) 5. The request is executed and the content from port 80 is returned to the attacker, allowing full bypass of SSRF mitigations. In the [DNS-pinning](https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/blob/8dff2f7525ead210a01347b48f53ae3f20
codewhale
source listed>= 0.8.41, < 0.8.64
### Maintainer resolution The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below. ### Summary DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic. ### Details Simplified attack scenario: 1. Attacker asks agent to visit the `mydomain.com`. 2. CodeWhale tries to resolve the IP of `mydomain.com`, however, the custom DNS server that's controlled by the attacker marks the request DNS query as failed (Time of Check). 3. CodeWhale allows the code to continue as it expects it request to fail again. 4. On the secondary (Time of Use), the DNS server resolves mydomain.com to a local IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1) 5. The request is executed and the content from port 80 is returned to the attacker, allowing full bypass of SSRF mitigations. In the [DNS-pinning](https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/blob/8dff2f7525ead210a01347b48f53ae3f20
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-6v2g-fpxh-pmmh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.