vulnerability / NVI-00014089 / Revision 1
k8saudit shipped rules do not detect privileged/sensitive settings on init or ephemeral containers
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit, github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit-eks, github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit-gke, github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit-aks, github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit-ovh. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
4.3 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit
source listed<= 0.17.0
The `k8saudit` plugin's per-container fields (`ka.req.pod.containers.*`) and the shipped `k8s_audit_rules.yaml` evaluated only `requestObject.spec.containers`. Security-relevant settings on a pod's `initContainers` or `ephemeralContainers` were not inspected, so the shipped `Create Privileged Pod` rule did not fire for a privileged container placed in either list. ### Impact An actor able to create pods (the activity k8saudit is intended to audit) could run a privileged container without triggering the default `Create Privileged Pod` rule, by declaring it as an `initContainer` or `ephemeralContainer` instead of a regular container. Kubernetes runs such containers with the requested privileges, but the shipped rule did not see them. The same gap applied to other per-container security settings (capabilities, `allowPrivilegeEscalation`, `runAsUser`, etc.) and, for deployments using a customized image allowlist, to disallowed images placed in those lists. This is a detection bypass of the default k8saudit ruleset, not a direct privilege escalation, and it requires the ability to create pods. The cloud-provider variants (`k8saudit-eks`, `k8saudit-gke`, `k8saudit-aks`, `k8saudit-ovh`
github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit-eks
source listed<= 0.11.0
The `k8saudit` plugin's per-container fields (`ka.req.pod.containers.*`) and the shipped `k8s_audit_rules.yaml` evaluated only `requestObject.spec.containers`. Security-relevant settings on a pod's `initContainers` or `ephemeralContainers` were not inspected, so the shipped `Create Privileged Pod` rule did not fire for a privileged container placed in either list. ### Impact An actor able to create pods (the activity k8saudit is intended to audit) could run a privileged container without triggering the default `Create Privileged Pod` rule, by declaring it as an `initContainer` or `ephemeralContainer` instead of a regular container. Kubernetes runs such containers with the requested privileges, but the shipped rule did not see them. The same gap applied to other per-container security settings (capabilities, `allowPrivilegeEscalation`, `runAsUser`, etc.) and, for deployments using a customized image allowlist, to disallowed images placed in those lists. This is a detection bypass of the default k8saudit ruleset, not a direct privilege escalation, and it requires the ability to create pods. The cloud-provider variants (`k8saudit-eks`, `k8saudit-gke`, `k8saudit-aks`, `k8saudit-ovh`
github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit-gke
source listed<= 0.8.0
The `k8saudit` plugin's per-container fields (`ka.req.pod.containers.*`) and the shipped `k8s_audit_rules.yaml` evaluated only `requestObject.spec.containers`. Security-relevant settings on a pod's `initContainers` or `ephemeralContainers` were not inspected, so the shipped `Create Privileged Pod` rule did not fire for a privileged container placed in either list. ### Impact An actor able to create pods (the activity k8saudit is intended to audit) could run a privileged container without triggering the default `Create Privileged Pod` rule, by declaring it as an `initContainer` or `ephemeralContainer` instead of a regular container. Kubernetes runs such containers with the requested privileges, but the shipped rule did not see them. The same gap applied to other per-container security settings (capabilities, `allowPrivilegeEscalation`, `runAsUser`, etc.) and, for deployments using a customized image allowlist, to disallowed images placed in those lists. This is a detection bypass of the default k8saudit ruleset, not a direct privilege escalation, and it requires the ability to create pods. The cloud-provider variants (`k8saudit-eks`, `k8saudit-gke`, `k8saudit-aks`, `k8saudit-ovh`
github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit-aks
source listed<= 0.5.1
The `k8saudit` plugin's per-container fields (`ka.req.pod.containers.*`) and the shipped `k8s_audit_rules.yaml` evaluated only `requestObject.spec.containers`. Security-relevant settings on a pod's `initContainers` or `ephemeralContainers` were not inspected, so the shipped `Create Privileged Pod` rule did not fire for a privileged container placed in either list. ### Impact An actor able to create pods (the activity k8saudit is intended to audit) could run a privileged container without triggering the default `Create Privileged Pod` rule, by declaring it as an `initContainer` or `ephemeralContainer` instead of a regular container. Kubernetes runs such containers with the requested privileges, but the shipped rule did not see them. The same gap applied to other per-container security settings (capabilities, `allowPrivilegeEscalation`, `runAsUser`, etc.) and, for deployments using a customized image allowlist, to disallowed images placed in those lists. This is a detection bypass of the default k8saudit ruleset, not a direct privilege escalation, and it requires the ability to create pods. The cloud-provider variants (`k8saudit-eks`, `k8saudit-gke`, `k8saudit-aks`, `k8saudit-ovh`
github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/plugins/k8saudit-ovh
source listed<= 0.5.0
The `k8saudit` plugin's per-container fields (`ka.req.pod.containers.*`) and the shipped `k8s_audit_rules.yaml` evaluated only `requestObject.spec.containers`. Security-relevant settings on a pod's `initContainers` or `ephemeralContainers` were not inspected, so the shipped `Create Privileged Pod` rule did not fire for a privileged container placed in either list. ### Impact An actor able to create pods (the activity k8saudit is intended to audit) could run a privileged container without triggering the default `Create Privileged Pod` rule, by declaring it as an `initContainer` or `ephemeralContainer` instead of a regular container. Kubernetes runs such containers with the requested privileges, but the shipped rule did not see them. The same gap applied to other per-container security settings (capabilities, `allowPrivilegeEscalation`, `runAsUser`, etc.) and, for deployments using a customized image allowlist, to disallowed images placed in those lists. This is a detection bypass of the default k8saudit ruleset, not a direct privilege escalation, and it requires the ability to create pods. The cloud-provider variants (`k8saudit-eks`, `k8saudit-gke`, `k8saudit-aks`, `k8saudit-ovh`
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-jhjp-4c2q-xmx4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.