vulnerability / NVI-00014097 / Revision 1
Wagtail: Identification of documents by SHA1 hash
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for wagtail, wagtail, wagtail, wagtail. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
3.7 low
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
wagtail
source listed< 7.0.9
### Impact By passing specific HTTP headers to the document serve URL endpoint, an attacker was able to determine whether a document with a given ID matched a specified SHA1 hash, regardless of any permission restrictions on the document or knowing its filename. This could allow an attacker to determine whether a document with a specific known hash is present in the Wagtail document library. This vulnerability does not expose the document's contents or any metadata beyond the already known SHA1 hash, and does not expose information about any documents for which the attacker does not know the SHA1 hash. ### Patches Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.0.9, 7.3.4, 7.4.3 and 8.0rc2. ### Workarounds Site owners who are unable to upgrade can strip `If-Match` and `If-None-Match` from anonymous requests to `/documents/` at the reverse proxy, or use a custom document model without a `file_hash` attribute. ### Acknowledgements Many thanks to Anand Himanshu for reporting this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Visit Wagtail's support channels * Email us at [security@
wagtail
source listed>= 7.1, < 7.3.4
### Impact By passing specific HTTP headers to the document serve URL endpoint, an attacker was able to determine whether a document with a given ID matched a specified SHA1 hash, regardless of any permission restrictions on the document or knowing its filename. This could allow an attacker to determine whether a document with a specific known hash is present in the Wagtail document library. This vulnerability does not expose the document's contents or any metadata beyond the already known SHA1 hash, and does not expose information about any documents for which the attacker does not know the SHA1 hash. ### Patches Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.0.9, 7.3.4, 7.4.3 and 8.0rc2. ### Workarounds Site owners who are unable to upgrade can strip `If-Match` and `If-None-Match` from anonymous requests to `/documents/` at the reverse proxy, or use a custom document model without a `file_hash` attribute. ### Acknowledgements Many thanks to Anand Himanshu for reporting this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Visit Wagtail's support channels * Email us at [security@
wagtail
source listed>= 7.4, < 7.4.3
### Impact By passing specific HTTP headers to the document serve URL endpoint, an attacker was able to determine whether a document with a given ID matched a specified SHA1 hash, regardless of any permission restrictions on the document or knowing its filename. This could allow an attacker to determine whether a document with a specific known hash is present in the Wagtail document library. This vulnerability does not expose the document's contents or any metadata beyond the already known SHA1 hash, and does not expose information about any documents for which the attacker does not know the SHA1 hash. ### Patches Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.0.9, 7.3.4, 7.4.3 and 8.0rc2. ### Workarounds Site owners who are unable to upgrade can strip `If-Match` and `If-None-Match` from anonymous requests to `/documents/` at the reverse proxy, or use a custom document model without a `file_hash` attribute. ### Acknowledgements Many thanks to Anand Himanshu for reporting this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Visit Wagtail's support channels * Email us at [security@
wagtail
source listed= 8.0rc1
### Impact By passing specific HTTP headers to the document serve URL endpoint, an attacker was able to determine whether a document with a given ID matched a specified SHA1 hash, regardless of any permission restrictions on the document or knowing its filename. This could allow an attacker to determine whether a document with a specific known hash is present in the Wagtail document library. This vulnerability does not expose the document's contents or any metadata beyond the already known SHA1 hash, and does not expose information about any documents for which the attacker does not know the SHA1 hash. ### Patches Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.0.9, 7.3.4, 7.4.3 and 8.0rc2. ### Workarounds Site owners who are unable to upgrade can strip `If-Match` and `If-None-Match` from anonymous requests to `/documents/` at the reverse proxy, or use a custom document model without a `file_hash` attribute. ### Acknowledgements Many thanks to Anand Himanshu for reporting this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Visit Wagtail's support channels * Email us at [security@
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-92hv-j533-69wc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.