vulnerability / NVI-00014127 / Revision 1
xmldom: Processing Instruction Target Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @xmldom/xmldom, @xmldom/xmldom, xmldom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@xmldom/xmldom
source listed>= 0.7.0, <= 0.8.14
## Summary `Document.createProcessingInstruction()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` performs no validation on the `target` parameter. The `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option validates only for `:` in the target and a case-insensitive `xml` prefix, but does not check for `>` characters. A `>` in the target breaks the processing instruction boundary (``), allowing injection of arbitrary content into the serialized XML output. ## Details `Document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` at `lib/dom.js` around line 2413 accepts any string as the `target` parameter and stores it on the PI node without validation. During serialization, the `requireWellFormed` code path (around line 3286) performs two checks on PI targets: 1. Rejects targets containing `:` (namespace prefix check) 2. Rejects targets matching `xml` case-insensitively (reserved prefix) However, it does NOT validate that the target conforms to the XML Name production, and critically does NOT check for `>` characters. Since processing instructions are serialized as ``, a `>` in the target prematurely closes the PI, causing the remaining content to be interpreted as document content by any downstream
@xmldom/xmldom
source listed>= 0.9.0, <= 0.9.11
## Summary `Document.createProcessingInstruction()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` performs no validation on the `target` parameter. The `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option validates only for `:` in the target and a case-insensitive `xml` prefix, but does not check for `>` characters. A `>` in the target breaks the processing instruction boundary (``), allowing injection of arbitrary content into the serialized XML output. ## Details `Document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` at `lib/dom.js` around line 2413 accepts any string as the `target` parameter and stores it on the PI node without validation. During serialization, the `requireWellFormed` code path (around line 3286) performs two checks on PI targets: 1. Rejects targets containing `:` (namespace prefix check) 2. Rejects targets matching `xml` case-insensitively (reserved prefix) However, it does NOT validate that the target conforms to the XML Name production, and critically does NOT check for `>` characters. Since processing instructions are serialized as ``, a `>` in the target prematurely closes the PI, causing the remaining content to be interpreted as document content by any downstream
xmldom
source listed<= 0.6.0
## Summary `Document.createProcessingInstruction()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` performs no validation on the `target` parameter. The `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option validates only for `:` in the target and a case-insensitive `xml` prefix, but does not check for `>` characters. A `>` in the target breaks the processing instruction boundary (``), allowing injection of arbitrary content into the serialized XML output. ## Details `Document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` at `lib/dom.js` around line 2413 accepts any string as the `target` parameter and stores it on the PI node without validation. During serialization, the `requireWellFormed` code path (around line 3286) performs two checks on PI targets: 1. Rejects targets containing `:` (namespace prefix check) 2. Rejects targets matching `xml` case-insensitively (reserved prefix) However, it does NOT validate that the target conforms to the XML Name production, and critically does NOT check for `>` characters. Since processing instructions are serialized as ``, a `>` in the target prematurely closes the PI, causing the remaining content to be interpreted as document content by any downstream
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.