vulnerability / NVI-00014146 / Revision 1
RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via Sub-Spec Frame Size Negotiation
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go
source listed< 1.13.0
## Summary A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the AMQP client's connection negotiation logic. The AMQP specification explicitly mandates a strict minimum frame size of 4096 bytes to prevent pathological packet fragmentation. While the library defines a `frameMinSize = 4096` constant, the connection negotiation loop fails to enforce this boundary, blindly accepting whatever maximum frame size (`FrameMax`) the server advertises during the handshake. If a client connects to a malicious or compromised AMQP broker that advertises an extremely low `FrameMax` (such as 1 byte), the negotiation succeeds. Consequently, every subsequent message transmission is forced to splinter into thousands or millions of single-byte frames, causing massive CPU overhead, thread contention, and a near-instantaneous application freeze. --- ## Vulnerability Details ### Mechanism During the connection establishment phase, the client and server negotiate connection parameters—including maximum channel count, heartbeat intervals, and maximum frame sizes. The vulnerability is located where the client accepts the server's tuning parameters: ```go // Connection negotiation logic maps server valu
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-xwwf-m8fg-p9q2 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.