vulnerability / NVI-00014158 / Revision 2
praisonaiagents web_crawl vulnerable to SSRF via redirect-following
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for praisonaiagents. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.507%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.43325. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
praisonaiagents
source listed< 1.6.58
### Summary `web_crawl` (an exported, model-callable tool) validates only the INITIAL URL's resolved IP against a private/loopback blocklist, then fetches with `httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True)` and never re-validates redirect targets. An attacker who controls the agent's crawl target (a malicious task, or prompt injection inside any page the agent already crawls) supplies a public URL that HTTP 302-redirects to an internal address. httpx follows the redirect, fetches the internal resource (cloud metadata `169.254.169.254`, localhost services, internal APIs), and returns its body into the agent context. This bypasses the SSRF protection added to fix the earlier web_crawl SSRF reports, so it is an incomplete fix for that class. httpx is the default crawl provider on a stock `pip install praisonaiagents`, so no provider configuration is required. ### Details 1. The agent is asked (or prompt-injected) to crawl `https://attacker.example/r`, which the source accepts because `attacker.example` resolves to a public IP. 2. The attacker server responds 302 Location: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`. 3. `_crawl_with_httpx` follows the redirec
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-5r34-2g38-6569 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-55525 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.