vulnerability / NVI-00014169 / Revision 1
utcp-http SSRF: HTTP tool invocation follows redirects without re-validating the target
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for utcp-http. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.2 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
utcp-http
source listed<= 1.1.3
## Summary `HttpCommunicationProtocol.call_tool` validates only the pre-redirect tool URL, then issues the request with redirects enabled and never re-checks where it lands. A tool whose endpoint is an attacker-controlled public URL can therefore `302`-redirect the UTCP client into an internal service including the cloud metadata endpoint and the response body is returned to the tool caller. This is a working SSRF + internal-data-exfiltration primitive. This is the redirect invariant of the SSRF class fixed in GHSA-39j6-4867-gg4w; that fix added an invocation-time URL check but left the redirect hop unguarded. This vector bypasses the GHSA-39j6-4867-gg4w mitigation via unvalidated redirects. ## Root cause 1. The resolved URL is validated once, before the request: https://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp/blob/4ed0a48b84a452338bd3e996efb0d169e8d75ac2/plugins/communication_protocols/http/src/utcp_http/http_communication_protocol.py#L281 2. The request is then made with aiohttp's default `allow_redirects=True` and no per-hop revalidation, so the redirect target bypasses the check entirely: https://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp/bl
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.