By Null Ventures MCP platform
Menu

vulnerability / NVI-00014175 / Revision 1

lmdeploy: Hardcoded trust_remote_code=True is an implicit unsafe remote-code load path with no user opt-out

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for lmdeploy. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-9xq9-36w5-q796CVE-2026-46517

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

7.8 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

lmdeploy

source listed
  • <= 0.12.3

> ## 📋 Reframing (2026-05-02): implicit unsafe remote-code path, not "supply-chain" > > The accurate description of this vulnerability is: > **"`get_model_arch` and related helpers hardcode `trust_remote_code=True` > with no opt-out, creating an implicit unsafe remote-code load path > on every model fetch."** > > What this report does NOT claim: > * It is NOT a network-attack RCE — the user supplies the model > reference; LMDeploy honors it. > * It is NOT a "supply chain" CVE in the classical sense (where a > benign upstream is compromised) — the user explicitly types the > repo name. > > What this report DOES claim: > * Other inference frameworks (vLLM, TGI, Hugging Face transformers > itself) all expose `--trust-remote-code` as **opt-in** so that > users who consciously load known-safe repos can opt in, while > users following a tutorial cannot accidentally execute attacker > Python by typing a wrong repo name. > * LMDeploy's hardcoded True is an **implicit** trust-boundary > override that violates HF Transformers' default-secure stance > (`trust_remote_code=False` since transformers ≥ 4.30). > * The fix is a one-line CLI flag (`--trust-remote-code`) defaulting

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-9xq9-36w5-q796 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗