vulnerability / NVI-00014983 / Revision 1
SSH.NET: ScpClient Recursive Download Allows Arbitrary File Write via Server-Controlled SCP Filenames
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for SSH.NET. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
SSH.NET
source listed<= 2025.1.0
## Summary `ScpClient.Download(string directoryName, DirectoryInfo directoryInfo)` writes files and directories using names returned by the remote SCP server during recursive downloads, with no validation that the resulting path stays inside the requested local directory. A malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle SCP server can return names containing `../` sequences (or absolute paths), causing the client to create directories and write/overwrite files anywhere the client process has access. This is similar to OpenSSH CVE-2019-6111, but with directory traversal capability. ## Impact A malicious/compromised/MITM SCP server can create or write files outside the intended download directory, anywhere the client process can write. Overwriting files such as ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, shell rc files, cron entries, or application binaries/config can lead to persistence, privilege escalation, or remote code execution on the client host. Requires the victim to perform a directory download from the attacker-controlled server. ## Remediation The fixed release ensures that remotely-supplied file and directory names are valid local nam
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-q939-rpr3-3284 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.