vulnerability / NVI-00014989 / Revision 1
Token Optimizer MCP: OS command injection in smart_user via username in get-user-info
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @ooples/token-optimizer-mcp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.4 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@ooples/token-optimizer-mcp
source listed< 5.1.0
### Summary `token-optimizer-mcp` is vulnerable to OS command injection in the `smart_user` tool. The `get-user-info` operation accepts a user-controlled `username` argument and later interpolates it into a shell command executed through `execAsync()`: ```ts getent passwd "${username}" || grep "^${username}:" /etc/passwd ``` Although the value is wrapped in double quotes, POSIX shells still evaluate command substitution such as `$(...)` and backticks inside double quotes. As a result, an MCP client can provide a crafted username such as: ```text $(id > /tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_ID) ``` and execute arbitrary local commands with the privileges of the user running the MCP server. This is a CWE-78 OS command injection issue. Tested version: ```text @ooples/token-optimizer-mcp v5.0.1 MCP serverInfo.name: token-optimizer-mcp MCP serverInfo.version: 0.2.0 ``` This issue is not related to the current `npm audit` dependency advisories. The vulnerability is in `token-optimizer-mcp`'s own tool implementation. --- ### Details The vulnerable code path is in the `smart_user` implementation. The `username` argument is eventually passed into a shell command similar to: ```ts c
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-49mq-fc6q-3h46 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.