vulnerability / NVI-00015001 / Revision 2
Glances: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-32608: action-template sanitizer is bypassed by nested stat values (process 'cmdline') → OS command injection
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for glances. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.8 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.197%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.09534. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
glances
source listed>= 4.5.2, < 4.5.6
## Summary CVE-2026-32608 ("Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates") was fixed (commit `5680a5d`) by adding `_sanitize_mustache_dict`, which replaces the shell operators `&&`, `|`, `>>`, `>` with spaces in the values rendered into action command templates. The sanitizer only processes **top-level string** values (`if isinstance(v, str)`). Attacker-controlled **nested** values — most notably a process's **`cmdline`, which Glances exposes as a `list`** and which is fully attacker-controlled via argv — are passed through **unsanitized**. Because the Mustache renderer (`chevron`) does **not** HTML-escape the pipe character `|`, a `|` embedded in such a nested value survives into the rendered command and is then interpreted by `secure_popen` (which still interprets `&&`/`|`/`>` by default, `allow_operators=True`), re-introducing the exact command injection the CVE was meant to close. ## Details The fix (`glances/actions.py`): ```python _SHELL_OPERATORS = ('&&', '|', '>>', '>') # line 25 def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict): # line 28 ... for k, v in mustache_dict.items(): if isinstance(v, str):
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-73wf-9vmv-5pv9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-62982 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.