vulnerability / NVI-00015034 / Revision 1
conflibot vulnerable to command injection via crafted pull request branch names under pull_request_target
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for wktk/conflibot. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.1 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
wktk/conflibot
source listed< 1.2.1
### Impact Versions of conflibot before `1.2.1` build `git` commands by string interpolation and run them through a shell. Several of the interpolated values are pull request branch names (`head.ref`), which are attacker-controlled: anyone can open a pull request (including from a fork) whose head branch name contains shell metacharacters such as `` ` ``, `$( )`, `;`, `|`, or `&`. The recommended workflow runs conflibot on the `pull_request_target` event, where the job has access to the base repository's secrets and a write-scoped `GITHUB_TOKEN`. As a result, a crafted branch name causes arbitrary command execution on the runner with that write token in the environment, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate secrets and the token, push to the repository, or otherwise abuse the token's permissions. No special privileges and no maintainer interaction are required — the action runs automatically when the pull request is opened. ### Affected configurations Any workflow using `wktk/conflibot` at a version earlier than `1.2.1`. The risk is highest under `pull_request_target` (the documented configuration), because that is where the write token and secrets are exposed to attacker-influenc
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-2qvg-qr73-mqxp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.