vulnerability / NVI-00015055 / Revision 1
vault-addr annotation SSRF -- webhook makes outbound HTTP call to attacker URL during admission; vault-serviceaccount enables cluster-wide SA token theft via TokenRequest API
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.6 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook
source listed<= 1.22.2
## Summary The vault-secrets-webhook reads the `vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr` annotation from any ConfigMap or Secret being admitted and uses it as the Vault server address without any validation or allowlist. When a ConfigMap or Secret contains a value prefixed with `vault:`, the webhook's admission handler synchronously calls the Vault API at the attacker-supplied address from inside the webhook process during the admission review. The webhook additionally grants `serviceaccounts/token:create` cluster-wide, and the `vault-serviceaccount` annotation controls which ServiceAccount's JWT is fetched and sent to that address. An attacker who can create ConfigMaps or Secrets in a watched namespace can cause the webhook process to make arbitrary outbound HTTP connections and exfiltrate ServiceAccount JWTs. ## Details `parseVaultConfig()` at `pkg/webhook/config.go:102-107` reads `VaultAddrAnnotation` unconditionally into `vaultConfig.Addr`: ```go if value, ok := annotations[common.VaultAddrAnnotation]; ok { vaultConfig.Addr = value } ``` No URL scheme validation, no hostname allowlist, no RFC-1918 or link-local filter. `MutateConfigMap` and `MutateSecret` at `pkg/web
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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