vulnerability / NVI-00015136 / Revision 1
java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in AppiumCommandExecutor
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for io.appium:java-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.2 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
io.appium:java-client
source listed>= 8.2.1, <= 10.1.0
## Summary When `directConnect(true)` is enabled, appium/java-client unconditionally accepts `directConnectHost`, `directConnectPort`, and `directConnectPath` from the server's NEW_SESSION response and silently redirects all subsequent session traffic to the attacker-specified endpoint — with no allowlist, no host validation, and no user notification. ## Affected Code - `AppiumCommandExecutor.java` (line 196–219): `setDirectConnect()` builds a new URL from server-supplied fields and calls `overrideServerUrl(newUrl)` without validating host/IP. - `DirectConnect.java`: `getUrl()` constructs `protocol://host:port/path` with no allowlist. ## Root Cause Only the protocol is validated (must equal "https"). The destination host and port are never checked against any allowlist or denylist. ## PoC (confirmed) A rogue server injecting `directConnectHost=127.0.0.1:4443` causes the client to silently redirect all post-session commands: [bootstrap] POST /wd/hub/session [bootstrap] Injecting directConnect -> https://127.0.0.1:4443/wd/hub [redirect-target] HIT #1: GET /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001/source [redirect-target] HIT #2: DELETE /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.