vulnerability / NVI-00015152 / Revision 1
Flowise: Unauthenticated Credential Abuse via Text-to-Speech Endpoint Allows Unauthorized Use of Private Chatflow TTS Credentials
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for flowise. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
flowise
source listed<= 3.1.3
## Summary The `/api/v1/text-to-speech/generate` endpoint is whitelisted (requires no authentication) and accepts any `chatflowId` without checking whether the referenced chatflow is public. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid chatflow UUID can abuse that chatflow's TTS credential (OpenAI or ElevenLabs API key) to generate unlimited text-to-speech audio, incurring costs on the chatflow owner's account. ## Details The TTS `generateTextToSpeech` controller at `packages/server/src/controllers/text-to-speech/index.ts:10-171` is whitelisted at `packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts:41`: ```typescript '/api/v1/text-to-speech/generate', ``` When a `chatflowId` is provided and the user is not authenticated (no `req.user`), the controller falls back to fetching the chatflow without workspace scoping: ```typescript // packages/server/src/controllers/text-to-speech/index.ts:36-42 if (workspaceId) { chatflow = await chatflowsService.getChatflowById(chatflowId, workspaceId) } else { // Fallback: get workspaceId from chatflow when req.user.activeWorkspaceId is not set chatflow = await chatflowsService.getChatflowById(chatflowId) // NO isPublic check workspaceId
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-8gj2-2cvc-6xx7 ↗
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- Revision 1 ·
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