vulnerability / NVI-00015161 / Revision 1
rclone local `--metadata` applies attacker-controlled mode/uid - setuid binary planted from an untrusted remote
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/rclone/rclone. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
3.6 low
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/rclone/rclone
source listed<= 1.74.3
### Summary When writing an object with metadata, the local backend applies the source-supplied `mode`, `uid`, and `gid` verbatim: it parses `mode` as an octal integer and passes it straight into `os.Chmod(o.path, os.FileMode(umode))`, and passes `uid`/`gid` straight into `os.Chown`. The value is never masked to permission bits, so any value with Go's `ModeSetuid` (1: /dest`, rclone writes the attacker's binary and makes it setuid. If the victim runs rclone as root (typical for system backup/restore), the `uid=0` chown plus setuid produces a root-owned setuid binary with attacker content — any local user then escalates to root. When rclone runs as a non-root service user, the planted setuid binary is owned by that user, giving any local user that user's privileges (lateral escalation / persistent backdoor). ### Details `backend/local/metadata.go`, `writeMetadataToFile()`: ```
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-945v-v9p3-v5xw ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.