vulnerability / NVI-00015195 / Revision 1
rclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overwrite and delete other users' repositories
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/rclone/rclone. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.8 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/rclone/rclone
source listed<= 1.74.3
## Summary `rclone serve restic --private-repos` exists to let one rclone instance host many users' restic backup repositories behind HTTP Basic auth while keeping each user confined to a path prefix of `//`. The documentation states the flag "can be used to limit users to repositories starting with a path of `//`", and the shipped test `TestResticPrivateRepositories` asserts that user `test` may reach `/test/config` but is `403`-blocked from `/other_user/config`. This isolation is the entire security purpose of the flag. The isolation is enforced by two independent chi middlewares that derive the username and the backend object path from two *different* sources, and the path source is never canonicalized. `checkPrivate` authorizes the request by comparing the routed `{userID}` path segment against the authenticated user, while `WithRemote` builds the backend object key from the raw, un-cleaned URL path. A request such as `GET //..//config` keeps the first path segment equal to the attacker's own username (so `checkPrivate` returns the request as authorized) yet hands the backend the literal remote `me/../victim/config`. On any backend that resolve
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-fqj9-69pf-6pjg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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