vulnerability / NVI-00015229 / Revision 1
ep_etherpad-lite: Device-to-device author-token transfer endpoint is replayable, never expires, and exposes the cleartext author token
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for ep_etherpad-lite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
ep_etherpad-lite
source listed>= 2.6.0, <= 3.0.0
Etherpad's device-to-device author-token transfer endpoint is replayable, never expires, and exposes the cleartext author token in the GET response body ## Description Etherpad ships an endpoint pair under `/tokenTransfer` (`src/node/hooks/express/tokenTransfer.ts`) that lets a logged-in user move their HttpOnly author token to a different browser (typically by scanning a QR code containing the transfer URL). The flow is: 1. **POST `/tokenTransfer`** — the source device sends a request whose own author cookie is read off the server-side cookie jar. The server mints a random UUID and stores the author token (and arbitrary `prefsHttp` field) under a DB key keyed by that UUID. The UUID is returned. 2. **GET `/tokenTransfer/{uuid}`** — the destination device GETs the URL containing the UUID. The server reads the stored record and sets the HttpOnly author cookie on the response. The original implementation has three serious flaws: 1. **No expiration check.** `createdAt` is written to the record on POST but never inspected on GET. A leaked transfer URL is redeemable indefinitely. 2. **No single-use enforcement.** The DB record is not deleted after a successful GET, so the same URL c
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-vqfp-p66c-xrp9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.