vulnerability / NVI-00015234 / Revision 1
ZITADEL Users Can Self-Verify Email/Phone via API
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/zitadel/zitadel, github.com/zitadel/zitadel, github.com/zitadel/zitadel. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
source listed>= 4.0.0, < 4.15.1
### Summary A vulnerability in Zitadel's self-management capability allowed users to mark their email and phone as verified without going through an actual verification process. While `GHSA-282g-fhmx-xf54` (CVE-2026-27946, "Users Can Self-Verify Email/Phone via UpdateHumanUser API") closed the path that let any authenticated user mark an arbitrary email or phone as verified on their own account by calling `UpdateHumanUser` with `email.is_verified: true`, additional paths were discovered. ### Impact Zitadel provides an API for managing users. The API also allows users to self-manage their own data including updating the email and phone. Due to an improper permission check, the API allowed returning the verification code for the email and phone to the own user. This allows users to claim ownership of an email or phone they do not control and potentially bypass email-based security policies. Note that when changing another user's email or phone, regardless of the verification flag, the permissions were correctly checked. ### Affected Versions Systems running one of the following versions are affecte
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
source listed>= 2.43.0, < 3.4.11
### Summary A vulnerability in Zitadel's self-management capability allowed users to mark their email and phone as verified without going through an actual verification process. While `GHSA-282g-fhmx-xf54` (CVE-2026-27946, "Users Can Self-Verify Email/Phone via UpdateHumanUser API") closed the path that let any authenticated user mark an arbitrary email or phone as verified on their own account by calling `UpdateHumanUser` with `email.is_verified: true`, additional paths were discovered. ### Impact Zitadel provides an API for managing users. The API also allows users to self-manage their own data including updating the email and phone. Due to an improper permission check, the API allowed returning the verification code for the email and phone to the own user. This allows users to claim ownership of an email or phone they do not control and potentially bypass email-based security policies. Note that when changing another user's email or phone, regardless of the verification flag, the permissions were correctly checked. ### Affected Versions Systems running one of the following versions are affecte
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
source listed< 1.80.0-v2.20.0.20260608144108-ed09b3df7f43
### Summary A vulnerability in Zitadel's self-management capability allowed users to mark their email and phone as verified without going through an actual verification process. While `GHSA-282g-fhmx-xf54` (CVE-2026-27946, "Users Can Self-Verify Email/Phone via UpdateHumanUser API") closed the path that let any authenticated user mark an arbitrary email or phone as verified on their own account by calling `UpdateHumanUser` with `email.is_verified: true`, additional paths were discovered. ### Impact Zitadel provides an API for managing users. The API also allows users to self-manage their own data including updating the email and phone. Due to an improper permission check, the API allowed returning the verification code for the email and phone to the own user. This allows users to claim ownership of an email or phone they do not control and potentially bypass email-based security policies. Note that when changing another user's email or phone, regardless of the verification flag, the permissions were correctly checked. ### Affected Versions Systems running one of the following versions are affecte
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-jq8w-8q2f-ffm9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.