vulnerability / NVI-00015252 / Revision 2
@hey-api/openapi-ts's `buildClientParams` template: prototype chain substitution via unknown `$___proto__` key
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @hey-api/openapi-ts. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
4.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
4.8 MEDIUM (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@hey-api/openapi-ts
source listed< 0.97.3
### Summary `dist/clients/core/params.ts` in `@hey-api/openapi-ts` ships a runtime template that is copied verbatim into every generated SDK as `params.gen.ts`. When a caller passes an object argument containing an unknown key starting with a slot prefix (`$body_`, `$headers_`, `$path_`, `$query_`), the function strips the prefix and writes the remainder directly to that slot without validation. The key `"$query___proto__"` causes the returned `params.query` object to have its prototype chain substituted with attacker-controlled data. The issue is present in all versions through at least `0.97.2`. ### Details The vulnerable branch in `dist/clients/core/params.ts`: ```typescript const extra = extraPrefixes.find(([prefix]) => key.startsWith(prefix)) if (extra) { const [prefix, slot] = extra ;(params[slot] as Record)[key.slice(prefix.length)] = value } ``` This branch runs for any key that (1) is not registered in the field map and (2) starts with one of the four slot prefixes. When a caller passes `"$query___proto__"` as an extra key alongside a legitimate field, the key is not in the field map, `key.startsWith("$query_")` is true, and `key.slice(7)` produce
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-hhx9-57xq-r5rw ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-48819 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.