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vulnerability / NVI-00015335 / Revision 2

Wire: Unauthenticated decoder crash via 32-bit length integer overflow in ByteArrayProtoReader32 (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-45799)

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime, com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-9rm7-3qhh-h2mcCVE-2026-63126

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

7.5 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime

source listed
  • <= 6.4.4

Wire's protobuf decoders did not consistently validate attacker-controlled length-delimited sizes against the current reader bounds before computing cursor, limit, or pointer positions. In the Kotlin runtime, `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray)` and `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString)` use the `ProtoReader32` fast path implemented by `ByteArrayProtoReader32`. In `ByteArrayProtoReader32.internalNextLengthDelimited()`, Wire read an untrusted varint length into an `Int` and rejected only negative values. A length such as `2147483647` is non-negative, so it passed that check, but `pos + length` overflowed the signed 32-bit cursor and produced a negative `limit`. The following `if (limit > pushedLimit)` guard did not catch this because the overflowed value was negative. That invalid limit then reached string, bytes, skip, and scalar-reading paths as an invalid byte count or invalid range. Instead of failing as a checked decode error such as `IOException`, malformed input could throw unchecked runtime exceptions including `IllegalArgumentException` and `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException`. Applications commonly treat malformed protobuf input as an expected decode failure; unchecked runtime except

GitHub Advisory Database

com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime

source listed
  • >= 7.0.0-alpha01, < 7.0.0-alpha04

Wire's protobuf decoders did not consistently validate attacker-controlled length-delimited sizes against the current reader bounds before computing cursor, limit, or pointer positions. In the Kotlin runtime, `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray)` and `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString)` use the `ProtoReader32` fast path implemented by `ByteArrayProtoReader32`. In `ByteArrayProtoReader32.internalNextLengthDelimited()`, Wire read an untrusted varint length into an `Int` and rejected only negative values. A length such as `2147483647` is non-negative, so it passed that check, but `pos + length` overflowed the signed 32-bit cursor and produced a negative `limit`. The following `if (limit > pushedLimit)` guard did not catch this because the overflowed value was negative. That invalid limit then reached string, bytes, skip, and scalar-reading paths as an invalid byte count or invalid range. Instead of failing as a checked decode error such as `IOException`, malformed input could throw unchecked runtime exceptions including `IllegalArgumentException` and `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException`. Applications commonly treat malformed protobuf input as an expected decode failure; unchecked runtime except

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-9rm7-3qhh-h2mc ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2026-63126 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

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