vulnerability / NVI-00015364 / Revision 1
Klever: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/klever-io/klever-go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.6 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/klever-io/klever-go
source listed< 1.7.19
## Summary When a marketplace order is settled (`MarketBuy` / `BuyItNow`, and auction `Claim`), the buyer's payment is split three ways — **referral**, **royalties**, and the **seller (market-order owner) remainder**: ``` marketOwnerAmount = CurrentBid − referralAmount − royaltiesAmount ``` Referral and royalties are paid out **unconditionally**, but the seller remainder is only paid **when positive** (`computeMarketOwnerAmount` returns `Ok` and pays nothing when the amount is `<= 0`). When `referral% + royalty%` exceeds 100% of the bid, `marketOwnerAmount` goes **negative** and is silently skipped — so the marketplace pays out **more KLV / sale currency than the buyer paid in**, minting the difference out of thin air. The combined ceiling `royalty% + referral% <= 100%` **is** checked once, at listing time (`Sell`). But the two percentages are sourced asymmetrically at settlement: - **referral %** is **snapshotted** into the order at `Sell` (`MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage`); - **royalty %** is **never snapshotted** — it is read **live** from the asset at buy time (`asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage`). So the listing-time invariant is a **time-of-check/time-of-use** guar
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.