vulnerability / NVI-00015371 / Revision 1
zot: Bearer authentication maps DELETE to push scope, allowing unauthorized deletion
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for zotregistry.dev/zot/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
zotregistry.dev/zot/v2
source listed< 2.1.18
### Summary A bearer token with only `pull` and `push` scopes can successfully delete manifests and blobs from a zot registry. The bearer authentication handler maps all non-GET/HEAD HTTP methods, including DELETE, to the `"push"` action, and the `DistSpecAuthzHandler` middleware is bypassed entirely for bearer-authenticated requests. This allows any client holding a push-only bearer token to delete arbitrary manifests and blobs within the token's repository scope, in violation of the Docker Distribution Token Authentication Specification. ### Details The vulnerability exists in two interacting components: **1. Action Mapping Collapse (`pkg/api/authn.go:571–586`)** The bearer authentication handler maps HTTP methods to token scope actions using a binary check: ```go action := "pull" if m := request.Method; m != http.MethodGet && m != http.MethodHead { action = "push" } ``` This collapses DELETE, PUT, PATCH, and POST into a single `"push"` action. The `"delete"` action is never assigned. **2. Authorization Bypass for Bearer Auth (`pkg/api/authz.go:270–275, 318–323`)** When a request is authenticated via bea
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
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Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.